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THE FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES
ENDORSEMENT OF CORPORATE-LEVEL
RESTITUTION: FURTHERANCE OF PUBLIC
POLICY OR DISCRIMINATION ON THE
BASIS OF ENTITY CAPITALIZATION?
HENRY AMOROSO*
I. INTRODUCTION
Prone to State-Simony, a sordid tribe,
Bonturo singly scorns the golden bribe
Nor sells the honours of his parent state.
- Dante Alighieri
The foregoing passage from The Divine Comedy makes clear
reference to the ubiquitous presence, reprehensible as it may be,
of financial inducements, and the readiness with which "simony"
may intercede and direct the course of events or, with respect to
individual experience, compel favorable reciprocity in action or
judgment. Indeed, all of history is littered with episodes of the
favor with which tidings or "munera", however intellectually cor-
rupt, may have been received as reflected in a judgment that may
have been rendered in resolution of one's cause. This article,
while certainly not suggesting that current practices at all resem-
ble the primitive turpitudes of an antiquated era, is intended to
examine the disparity with which a corporate organizational
transgressor capable of making restitution may redeem itself in
the eyes of a sentencing jurist, as compared with a similar entity
that is not as advantageously capitalized, and whether such dis-
parity furthers the public policy goals contemplated by the Fed-
eral Sentencing Commission.
Historically, the object of a repentant criminal or moral trans-
gressor has been to seek the equivalent of religious or societal
redemption. Yet even "redemption", when derived from its literal
roots, suggests a payment in exchange for restored integrity.
"Redemption" comes from the Latin "emere" or "to buy"; an "emp-
tio" is a purchase, and a "re-(d)emptio" is therefore a repurchase, a
* Henry J. Amoroso, Assistant Professor, Seton Hall University, S.Orange,
N.J.
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ransom or a buying back. The curing of harm occasioned by
wrongdoing, therefore, has a long history of being accomplished
through the payment of tidings or a bartering of physical or polit-
ical capital. Indeed, in antiquated times, wealthy tidings or even
letters of influence submitted on behalf of a litigant and intended
as an inducement influencing the performance of a judicial func-
tion to be otherwise exercised gratuitously were accepted practice.
In fact, historically, restitution to the victim was rare; a "just judg-
ment" signified the tolerable custom of a payment extorted by the
judge for the rendering of justice.1 Indeed, le Chantre wrote in
1192 that if one could not obtain justice without money at the sec-
ular court, a payoff must go to the judge, although the judge would
then be obligated to return to the litigant any usurious costs the
litigant incurred in endeavoring to raise the tolerably illicit tid-
ing.2 In this vein, John Bromyard did not characterize offerings
by litigants to magistrates as illegal; rather, he postulated, any
untoward abuse of this exchange would more appropriately be
attributed to the ineffectiveness of secular law and the absence of
any clear secular rules governing the receipt of restitution and
gifts by judges. 3
The act of restitution, in a more cerebral sense, has been char-
acterized by Thomas Aquinas as a natural exponent of our com-
mutative system of justice, i.e., that system of justice which is
directed toward the individuals that comprise a community, which
is, in turn, founded upon the totality of exchanges that occur
between its composite members. It is a system of exchange to
cover actions and reactions benefitting and injuring people, and
restitution is introduced to cover repayment for the physical and
psychological effects of such actions and reactions.4 In a primitive
society, such a dynamic found expression is such tenets as "an eye
for an eye" or, in the modern sense, "quid pro quo". In any event,
restitution is a concept which, with the facility and development of
capital as a means of exchange, has come to encapsulate social
and economic utility, as well as fundamental notions of societal
and punitive justice.
The United States Sentencing Commission, in its recent
enactment of Chapter Eight of the United States Sentencing
1. Letter from St. Augustine to Macedonius, Letter Number 153.
2. See JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., BRIBES (1984).
3. JoHN BROMYARD, SUMMA PRAEDICANTIUM, reprinted in LEONARD E.BOYLE,
PASTORAL CARE, CLERICAL EDUCATION AND CANON LAW, 1200-1400 (1981).
4. THoMAs AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICAE (Timothy McDermott ed., 1989).
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Guidelines, has erected a sophisticated sentencing scheme which
places special emphasis upon the payment of restitution by an
organization for the harm occasioned by its own criminal wrong-
doing. Designed to give uniformity and consistency to the manner
in which criminal sentences are imposed at the entity level, the
new Chapter Eight features an empirical sentencing formula that
provides for the mitigation of nominal pecuniary penalties associ-
ated with a corporate criminal offense in those instances where
the defendant-firm has demonstrated clear recognition and affirm-
ative responsibility for its criminal conduct. Although such recog-
nition and responsibility is manifest in the entity's own admission
of wrongdoing and the observable behavior associated with such
accountability, the Sentencing Guidelines appear to have been
carefully crafted so as to eliminate any special consideration or
empirical weight attributed to the organization's voluntary pay-
ment of restitution. Although not specified in its preamble, the
Guidelines are presumably so drafted in order to avoid discrimina-
tion against firms with a less advantageous balance sheet.
Notwithstanding, it may be observed that the Federal Sen-
tencing Guidelines do permit a sentencing judge to invoke his dis-
cretion and depart downward from the punishment prescribed
under the formula. where it can be demonstrated that the corpo-
rate defendant has incurred substantial costs in remediating the
harm visited by its own conduct. In recognition of a firm's efforts
to redress the injury occasioned by its own nefarious conduct, the
Sentencing Commission has characterized remedial efforts as the
sort of mitigating factor that may justify a downward departure
from a more elevated pecuniary penalty that would otherwise be
prescribed under the rigid formula. Although perhaps intended to
further the public policy goal of championing the victim, the effect
of the sentencing formula in this regard may be to discriminate
against smaller, more sparsely capitalized firms who do not pos-
sess the financial wherewithal to make restitution.
II. CORPORATE FEDERAL SENTENCING GuIDELINES
The United States Sentencing Commission was created under
the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984.1 The Commission is an
"independent commission in the judicial branch" and has the duty
5. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551-59 (Supp. II 1984), amended by 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551-59
(1994) and 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-998 (Supp. II 1984), amended by 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-
998 (1994).
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to establish determinative sentencing guidelines for the federal
judicial system and "review and revise" the guidelines. The
guidelines are "binding on the courts, although... the judge has
the discretion to depart from the guideline applicable to a particu-
lar case if the judge finds an aggravating or mitigating factor pres-
ent that the Commission did not adequately consider when
formulating guidelines."7 Releasing its initial set of Sentencing
Guidelines, which became effective on November 1, 1987, the
Commission strove to further the basic purposes of punishment in
the federal system: "deterring crime, incapacitating the offender,
providing just punishment, and rehabilitating the offender." 8 In
attempting to accommodate these diverse interests, the Guide-
lines specifically rejected the adoption of a single philosophical
theory with respect to sentencing, and avoided any pronounce-
ments with respect to the primacy of any of the goals espoused
within the commentary. 9 Initially, therefore, the Guidelines did
not demonstrate a preference for the attainment of any of the
numerous goals originally contemplated by the Sentencing Com-
mission in its drafting. The Commission's detached posture, how-
ever, would eventually change with respect to the sentencing of
organizations.
In October 1986, the Commission issued its preliminary
report on separate guidelines for corporate offenders. On May 1,
1991, and after solicitation of public commentary and a series of
re-drafts, the Commission submitted to Congress its final proposal
for what now constitutes Chapter Eight of the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines. These proposed guidelines became law on November
1, 1991 and, as will be seen, expressed a significant predisposition
in favor of payments of restitution.
The introductory comments to the sentencing guidelines rec-
ognize the legacy of case law surrounding corporate entity and
director/officer liability in a criminal setting, namely, that corpo-
rations can act only through their agents and generally are vicari-
ously liable for offenses committed by their agents. 10 However, in
6. 28 U.S.C. §§ 991, 994, quoted in Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361,
368-69 (1989).
7. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 367.
8. UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMM'N, SENTENCING AND POLICY
STATEMENTS 1 (1987).
9. Paul H. Robinson, A Sentencing System for the 21st Century?, 66 Tzx. L.
REv. 1 (1987).
10. UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMM'N, GUIDELINES MAN. (Nov.1995)
[hereinafter U.S.S.G.], ch. 3 intro. cmt.
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another vein these Introductory Comments make it clear that the
first principle underlying this new Chapter is that "the court
must, whenever practicable, order the organization to remedy any
harm caused by the offense. The resources expended to remedy
the harm should not be viewed as punishment, but rather as a
means of making victims whole for the harm caused."11 This first
indication of the Commission's acknowledgment of the unique
ability of the firm to redress its injurious conduct for societal gain
is a substantial departure from the more passive theorizing sug-
gested by the Guidelines in the individual context.
The Guidelines further specify that "if the organization oper-
ated primarily for a criminal purpose or primarily by criminal
means, the fine should be set sufficiently high to divest the organi-
zation of all of its assets."[emphasis added]12 Moreover, "the fine
range for any other organization should be based on the serious-
ness of the offense and the culpability of the organization."1 3 The
seriousness of the offense generally will be reflected by the highest
of the monetary gain, the monetary loss, or the amount in a guide-
line offense level fine table. "Culpability generally will be deter-
mined by the steps taken by the organization prior to the offense
to prevent and detect criminal conduct, the level and extent of
involvement in or tolerance of the offense by certain personnel,
and the organization's actions after an offense has been
committed."14
Finally, probation is considered an appropriate sentence for
an organizational defendant when needed to ensure that another
sanction will be fully implemented, or that internal steps will be
taken within the organization to reduce the likelihood of future
conduct. 15 This last provision, whose full import and significance
has yet to find expression in the case law, notwithstanding shows
the potential for a future channelling of the behavior and
resources of corporate offenders in a manner so as to maximize
social and economic utility.
III. THE FoRmuLA
The guidelines' greatest impact deals with additional fines,
after restitution, for organizations whose primary purpose was
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
2291996]
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not to engage in criminal activity. The fine is a function of the
seriousness of the offense and the culpability of the organization.16
Essentially, the Sentencing Guidelines prescribe that a base fine
be established according to the gravity of the criminal harm.17
This base fine is then multiplied by a "culpability multiplier", a
number ranging from .05 to 4.00, which reflects a myriad of fac-
tors, including the degree of organizational participation in the
criminal activity.18 Thus, depending upon the extent of corporate
misconduct, the base fine may be either increased or decreased by
a significant percentage that will translate into the actual sanc-
tion that is eventually assessed upon the corporate wrongdoer.
Once "Minimum" and "Maximum" Multipliers have been applied
to the base fine, the sentencing court is provided with a range of
fines within which it may derive the appropriate sanction.
The seriousness of the offense finds expression in the estab-
lishment of a "base fine", arrived at by adopting the greatest of the
following: (1) the monetary loss suffered by the victim; (2) the
monetary gain received by the defendant; or (3) a penalty deter-
mined by analyzing the offense Level Fine Table. 19 The Offense
Level Fine Table is calculated by using the base offense level, with
any adjustments, as established in Chapter Two of the Sentencing
Guidelines.2 ° The fine range from the Table, before any culpabil-
ity score is applied, is $5,000 to $72,500,000.21 With Minimum
and Maximum Culpability Multipliers of 5% to 400%, respec-
tively, this Table range is effectively extended from $250 to
$290,000,000.
Regardless of how the base fine is calculated, this amount can
be either increased or decreased, based on an the applied "culpa-
bility multiplier".22 The actual multiplier, ranging from .05 to
4.00, is taken from a Table of Minimum and Maximum Multipli-
ers23 which converts an organization's "culpability score" (a score
ranging from "zero" to "ten or above") to a Multiplier number.24
Every organization begins with a culpability score of five
points which may be subsequently increased or decreased based
16. U.S.S.G. §§ 8C2.4-8C2.6.
17. U.S.S.G. §§ 8C2.4
18. U.S.S.G. §§ 8C2.5-8C2.6.
19. U.S.S.G. § 8C2.4
20. U.S.S.G. §§ 8C2.3-8C2.4.
21. U.S.S.G. § 8C2.4(d)
22. U.S.S.G. § 8C2.6
23. Id.
24. Id.
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on several factors previously addressed.25 For example, the score
will be increased based upon the judge's determination of the
following:
(1) The size of the organization: The larger the organization and
the greater the number of persons it employs, the greater
number of points that are added to the culpability score;
26
(2) The extent of involvement of top officials: Clearly, the deter-
mination that top executives or other officers of the firm had
overtly contributed to the criminal act will add points to the
culpability score;
27
(3) Existence of prior violations: A prior conviction, especially for
the same or a similar offense, will raise the culpability score;
28
and
(4) Acts which constitute obstruction of justice: Should the corpo-
ration be found to have impeded the progress of the prosecu-
tion of the offense, the firm will be penalized accordingly.29
The culpability score will be decreased based upon the court's
determination of the following:
(1) The presence of effective programs to prevent and detect viola-
tions: This form of organizational encouragement speaks
directly to the establishment of an active internal ethics
scheme as an integral part of the firm's organizational
structure;
30
(2) The extent of voluntary disclosure to the appropriate
authority;
3 1
(3) Cooperation with an investigation conducted by the appropri-
ate authority: This mitigating factor, in conjunction with the
second factor, contrasts with the penalty exacted upon the firm
should it obstruct the investigation or prosecution of the
crime;32 and
(4) Acceptance of responsibility by the organization.33
Once the culpability score is calculated, the Maximum and
Minimum Multipliers are derived simply by taking those multipli-
ers which correspond to the appropriate culpability score as
25. U.S.S.G. § 8C2.5(a)
26. See U.S.S.G. § 8C2.5(b). This reinforces the Commission's concern for
structural changes within the organization.
27. U.S.S.G. § 8C2.5(b)
28. U.S.S.G. § 8C2.5(c)
29. U.S.S.G. § 8C2.5(e)
30. U.S.S.G. § 8C2.5(f).
31. U.S.S.G. § 8C2.5(g)(1).
32. U.S.S.G. § 8C2.5(g)(1),(2).
33. U.S.S.G. § 8C2.5(g)(2),(3).
1996] 231
7
Amoroso: The Federal Sentencing Guidelines Endorsement of Corporate-Level
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1996
CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW
reflected on the conversion table.3 4 A higher culpability score
establishes a higher minimum and maximum range of multipliers.
The maximum multiplier is 400% of the fine35, which has the
mathematical effect of multiplying a fine by four. A lower culpa-
bility score will act to decrease the minimum and maximum mul-
tipliers, which can have the effect of dramatically reducing a fine.
The minimum multiplier is 5% of the fine36 , which has the mathe-
matical effect of dividing the base fine by twenty. Thus, the culpa-
bility score, once translated into a multiplier and applied to a pre-
determined base fine, will give rise to either a multiple or fraction
of said base fine, depending on the degree to which the corpora-
tion's behavior may be characterized as nefarious or otherwise
criminal.
IV. STATUTORY REFERENCE TO RESTITUTION
As alluded to above, the Sentencing Guidelines emphasize
that the primary penalty to be extracted from the corporate
offender following an adjudication of guilt is restitution, and that,
in the absence of a firm's ability to make reparations, the calcula-
tion and imposition of a punitive assessment will not need to be
reached by the sentencing court.37 However, the import of redress
in this context is objectively where the Guidelines' consideration
of restitution ends. It is submitted that by failing to provide the
firm greater incentives to actively make restitution or provide
levels of public redress exceeding the nominal harm occasioned by
the firm's conduct, the Guidelines do not punish corporate offend-
ers appropriately to achieve paramount societal benefit. This is by
its very terms inefficient.
According to the Guidelines, at several junctures within the
formula, mitigating factors may attach and cause a diminution in
the overall fine ultimately prescribed by the Guidelines. Although
the Base Offense Level, and hence the Base Fine, is a function of
the nature of the offense and is independent of the characteristics
or culpability personal to the offender, the Culpability Score and
its concomitant Minimum and Maximum Multipliers may be pro-
portionately decreased by sufficiently extenuating circumstances.
Furthermore, mitigating factors may further influence the judge
to place the defendant nearer to the bottom of the range of appli-
34. U.S.S.G. § 8C2.6.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. See supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text.
232 [Vol. 18:225
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cable fines ultimately prescribed by the Guidelines. Conspicu-
ously absent from such mitigating considerations, however, is the
object of restitution.
Once a Base Fine has been calculated, adjustments thereto
are effectuated through the empirical representation of the firm's
conduct in the Culpability Score. However, nowhere within the
Guidelines is the firm's prompt and complete payment of restitu-
tion recognized as a mitigating factor capable of reducing the
firm's overall culpability score. Although under Section 8C2.5(g)
the Guidelines prescribe that the culpability score may be reduced
by as much as five points through the existence of "[s]elf-report-
ing, [clooperation and [aicceptance of [r]esponsibility",3 s the com-
mentary thereto clearly defines this particular mitigating factor
as evidence of the "truthful admission of involvement in the
offense and related conduct." (emphasis added).39 Restitution,
therefore, has been excluded from consideration of a firm's
"acceptance of responsibility".4 °
Upon application of the Minimum and Maximum Multipliers
to the base Fine, the court is left with a range of fines from which
it may select a final penalty. The Guidelines prescribe a series of
factors which the court must consider in determining the fine
within the range, but nowhere among such factors is the timely
and complete payment of restitution considered. 4' This is again
contrary to the deference accorded the acceptance of responsibility
in the individual context. 42
It is clear that the Guidelines have been carefully drawn so as
to make restitution a primary goal, but it is equally clear that the
Sentencing Commission has striven, at least objectively, to avoid
disparate treatment of corporate defendants on the basis of status
or financial wherewithal. However, as can be seen, the Guidelines
do contain an inherent complexity in certain, albeit limited, dis-
cretion vested within the court to depart from the rigid formula, or
to otherwise prescribe terms and conditions of probation.
38. U.S.S.G. § 8C2.5(g)
39. U.S.S.G. § 8C2.5, cmt. (n. 13).
40. This exclusion is even more evident when comparing Section 8C2.5 with
the corresponding definition as set forth under the "individual offender"
counterpart to Chapter Eight, namely, Chapter Three which provides that
"acceptance of responsibility" may be evidenced by the voluntary payment of
restitution prior to the adjudication of guilt. U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1, cmt. (n. 1)(c).
41. U.S.S.G. § 8C2.8 and commentary thereto.
42. U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1 and commentary thereto.
1996] 233
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V. COURT'S DISCRETION IN DEPARTING FROM GuIDELINES
Although the formula set forth under the Sentencing Guide-
lines is intended to provide uniformity and constancy in the sen-
tencing of organizational offenders, the sentencing court is vested
with a certain measure of discretion to depart therefrom where
the circumstances of a particular case so warrant. For example,
under Sections 8C4.1 through 8C4.11 of Chapter Eight, the court
is permitted to proportionately depart from the Guidelines when
confronted with sufficiently persuasive aggravating or mitigating
factors.4 3 Interestingly, the Guidelines have included, among
such circumstances, evidence of payment of remedial costs by the
offender greatly exceeding the gain from criminal activity.
44
Without the benefit of further commentary or guidance, it appears
that the Guidelines have hinted that restitution may yet serve to
redeem the corporate wrongdoer in the eyes of the sentencing
judge.
Similarly, under Section 8D1.1, the sentencing court is given
broad latitude in determining whether to impose probation on the
firm as a measure of its punishment.45 Of course, the Guidelines
do not provide for the particulars of such punishment, but none-
theless suggest a structured repayment of restitution or other pro-
ductive utilization to which the assets, income potential, or
human or capital resources of the corporate transgressor may be
placed. It is submitted that such broad judicial discretion poses
radical implications for the prospective nature of corporate pun-
ishment, if taken to its practical extreme, as judges could conceiv-
ably commit the resources of the corporate offender to what the
court may determine to be its highest societal or economic utility,
all of which would be accomplished under the authority of the
court's punishing power. This perhaps is the subject of further
research.
Although the Guidelines have been carefully drawn so as to
remove the influence of restitution from the nominal calculation of
the prescribed fine, the Sentencing Commission, in providing for a
43. The overriding standard which must be identified to the court's
satisfaction before departure will be sanctioned has been codified in 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(b)(1994), i.e. where "there exists an aggravating or mitigating
circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration by
the Sentencing Commission in formulating the guidelines that should result in a
sentence different from that described." Id.
44. U.S.S.G. § 8C4.9.
45. U.S.S.G. § 8D1.1.
234 [Vol. 18:225
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departure and the imposition of probation, appears to be laboring
over the dynamic that exists between the remediation of harm and
the disparity that may be thereby occasioned among corporate
wrongdoers of varying capital resources. The practical implica-
tions of this dynamic are self-evident, but without further instruc-
tion from the Commentary to the Guidelines, it is necessary to
look to the relevant decisional law for guidance.
V. THE DECIsIoNAL LAw
The relative infancy of the newly enacted Chapter Eight is
attended by a commensurate dearth in case law decisions inter-
preting the circumstances under which a departure from the
Guidelines is appropriate. Notwithstanding, the body of deci-
sional law pertaining to departures in the individual as opposed to
entity context may prove instructive in suggesting how the discre-
tionary aspects of Chapter Eight may prospectively be applied.
Generally, the sentencing court must select a sentence from
within the range calculated under the formula. The Commission,
in fact, has described the Guidelines as "carving out a 'heartland',
a set of typical cases embodying the conduct that each guideline
describes."4 6 A sentencing court may, however, impose a sentence
outside of the presumptive range established under the appropri-
ate guideline if the court finds that "there exists an aggravating or
mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately
taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission in formu-
lating the guidelines."47 Although the Guidelines enumerate vari-
ous factors that may constitute the basis for a departure, the
identification and application of other, perhaps non-enumerated
factors is left to the discretion of the sentencing judge.48 To this
end, it has been uniformly held that a sentencing system tailored
to fit every conceivable wrinkle of each case would quickly become
unworkable and seriously compromise the goals of the Guidelines
46. U.S.S.G. ch. 1, Pt. A, intro. cmt. (n. 4)(b).
47. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1994). One should note that a departure may be
warranted under two separate conditions: a) qualitative, where a court finds an
aggravating or mitigating circumstance "of a kind" not within the contemplation
of the Sentencing Commission in formulating the Guidelines; or b) quantitative,
where the court finds an aggravating or mitigating circumstance "present 'to a
degree' neither readily envisioned nor frequently seen in connection with the
offender and/or the offense of conviction." United States v. Sklar, 920 F.2d 107,
115 (1st Cir. 1990).
48. United States v. Lara, 905 F.2d 599, 602 (2nd Cir. 1990).
1996] 235
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themselves, so that their rigid mechanized application must be
avoided.49 For that reason, a court is provided significant flexibil-
ity in considering departures.50
Restitution has been traditionally frowned upon as a basis for
departure from the Guidelines in determining a defendant's sen-
tence.5 1 Indeed, courts are wary of permitting individual defend-
ants to "buy their way out of prison sentences",5 2 and traditionally
were predisposed against the double-counting of restitution in
determining whether a departure under the guidelines was appro-
priate.5 3 In United States v. Carey, for example, the Court rea-
soned that because restitution had already been contemplated by
the Guidelines in permitting a reduction in the base offense level
under Section 3E1.1 of the Act, under "acceptance of responsibil-
ity", the same mitigating factor could not subsequently be used to
obtain a further downward adjustment in the defendant's sen-
tence in the form of a departure.5 4 More recent cases, however,
have abandoned this proscription as courts have sought to find,
where possible, behavior that exceeds what is normally present in
the promptness, voluntariness or amount (i.e., degree) of restitu-
tion that is tendered. 55
In United States v. Garlich56 , for example, the defendant was
charged with fraud in the form of over-encumbering collateral for
certain bank loans. Before his indictment, and in conjunction
with pending civil litigation, however, the defendant turned over
his assets of $1.4 million to the numerous banks as payment for
the fraudulently obtained loans and capital loans against his auto-
mobile dealership. The district court found that the loss attribu-
table to the defendant's scheme was approximately $253,000.00,
and awarded the defendant a two-level downward departure from
the fine prescribed under the guidelines. The Eighth Circuit
49. See id. at 603-05.
50. United States v. Sturgis, 869 F.2d 54, 57 (2d Cir. 1989). See United States
v. Lieberman, 971 F.2d 989, 999 (3d Cir. 1992).
51. United States v. Bean, 18 F.3d 1367 (7th Cir. 1994). See also United
States v. Seacott, 15 F.3d 1380, 1388-89 (7th Cir. 1994); United States v. Carey,
895 F.2d 318, 323 (7th Cir. 1990).
52. Seacott, 15 F.3d at 1389.
53. Carey, 895 F.2d at 323.
54. Id.
55. United States v. Lieberman, 971 F.2d 989 (3d Cir. 1992); United States v.
Garlich, 951 F.2d 161 (8th Cir. 1991).
56. 951 F.2d 161 (8th Cir. 1991).
236 [Vol. 18:225
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affirmed this ruling on appeal and remanded the case for consider-
ation of further departure.57
Similarly, in United States v. Lieberman5", the defendant
plead guilty to a charge that he embezzled bank funds in the
approximate amount of $94,000.00. The plea agreement stipu-
lated that the actual loss to the bank was between $50,000.00 and
$100,000.00. However, it was learned at the time of sentencing
that, pursuant to a companion civil suit, the defendant agreed to
pay the bank damages in the amount of $128,442.37 with pre-
judgment interest in the amount of $11,967.04. The Third Circuit
concluded the district court was justified in its decision to depart
downward. 59
Interestingly, in United States v. Bean6 ° , the Seventh Circuit
acknowledged that a downward departure would be permissible
even where the defendant denied all guilt for the crime with which
he was charged, so long as extraordinary restitution had been ten-
dered. In that case, the Court eventually vacated the departure
and remanded, because the facts demonstrated that the defendant
had merely paid the $75,000.00 debt occasioned by his behavior
without any interest penalty.61
These cases clearly demonstrate that the standard for depar-
tures set forth under 18 U.S.C. 3553(b) has been somewhat abro-
gated by the case law. Rather than requiring extraordinary
responsiveness to guilt as contemplated under the foregoing stat-
ute and the commentary to the Sentencing Guidelines, the deci-
sional law seems to favor downward departures even where the
payment of restitution is less-than-voluntary (i.e., made in con-
junction with a civil suit), or even where such payment is accom-
panied by a denial of culpability, so long as the amount of
restitution paid is extraordinary. If one is to assume that the
standard for a downward departure will be common to the prose-
cution of organizational as well as individual offenders, then cor-
porate offenders will gain an advantage by structuring their
finances in such a way as to accommodate the risks of criminal
57. Id.
58. 971 F.2d 989 (3d Cir. 1992).
59. Id.
60. 18 F.3d 1367 (7th Cir. 1994).
61. Id. The Court drew an analogy to United States v. Carey, 895 F.2d 318
(7th Cir. 1990), in which the departure accorded the defendant was vacated in
the presence of information that he had paid through restitution only ninety-one
percent of the debt, and without any interest component.
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prosecution and the need to make exponential remediative efforts.
This postulation necessarily brings to bear the dichotomy between
apparent discrimination against corporate transgressors on the
basis of financial wherewithal and the overriding public policy of
victim rehabilitation and aggregate social and economic utility. It
remains to be seen the manner in which these competing notions
find expression in the decisions of our courts, and the manner in
which the policies espoused by the Sentencing Commission in its
1991 enactment are given life and effect.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Sentencing Guidelines have made clear the importance
and primacy of restitution in its sentencing scheme with respect to
corporate criminal offenders, and have rendered redress distinct
from actual pecuniary punishment. That is, if an entity is capable
of making restitution, such reparations will be ordered independ-
ent of any punishment exacted upon the wrongdoer. Indeed, the
Guidelines have taken special measure to ensure that an entity's
remedial efforts are not quantified within the variables that com-
prise the corporate sentencing formula.
With a certain measure of complexity, however, the Guide-
lines appear to permit the courts a modicum of discretion in con-
struing the firm's acceptance of responsibility or payment of
extraordinary remedial costs as a mitigating factor, and if inter-
pretations of the corporate departure provisions mimic the case
law standards set forth in the individual context, this window of
redemption will be cast wide open as a sentencing consideration of
significant force.
There exists within the Guidelines, therefore, an apparent
dynamic contrasting the competing interests of an indiscriminate
treatment of all defendants, regardless of financial wherewithal,
with the efficient use of the resources of a well-endowed corporate
defendant for the common good. The former speaks to the very
foundations of equity and fairness upon which our criminal justice
system has been erected. The latter recognizes the unique iden-
tity of the corporation, and the tremendous potential that exists
for an efficient allocation and utilization of the corporate assets,
income potential and human and capital resources to achieve
maximum economic and societal utility. The ultimate fate of this
dynamic is yet to be witnessed, and only with the rendering of
decisions will it be seen whether restitution is championed as a
pillar of our commutative system of justice, as contemplated by
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Aquinas, or wielded as an instrument of redemption, as symbol-
ized in the exchange of "simony" characteristic of an era long since
passed.
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